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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
LARRY ELLIOTT and 
\HLLIAM H. CLAYTON, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case Nos, 17350, 
17351, 17358 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants were charged with Aggravated Sexual 
~ssault in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-405 (1953, 
as amended) • They were convicted of the lesser included 
offense of Forcible Sodomy in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-403 (1953, as amended), 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COflRT 
Appellants, Larry Elliott and \'lilliam H, Clayton, 
· .. :ere found guilty of Forcible Sodomy by a jury in the Fourth 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Maurice Harding, 
Judge, presiding, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks aff irmance of the verdicts of 
guilty rendered by the jury below, 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
All parties involved in this crime were inmates 
at the Utah County Jail on May 4, 1980, the date of the 
offense (T. 17,18), The victim, Dennis Lynn Frazier resided 
in a cell with one of the appellants, Elliott (T,18), 
The other appellant, Clayton, was housed in a nearby cell 
which did not lock (T.20,86,105). The victim testified that 
shortly after lock-up on May 4, 1980 appellant Elliott 
grabbed him, took off his pants and drug him to the cell 
bars where appellant Clayton was (T,24), Clayton then held 
the victim who was facinq inward to the cell while Elliott 
told the victim to "lick my dick" and "give me a blow job" 
and we will leave you alone (T,24), The victim refused 
and a struggle ensued. The appellant Clayton took his 
penis out of his pants and attempted to get the victim to 
take it in his mouth (T.26), Although the penis did not ente: 
his mouth at this point there was a touching of Clayton's 
penis and the victim's mouth (T.26). The victim was 
struck by Elliott and even became temporarily unconscious 
as result of choking (T.33,45,92). 
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The appellants stopped temporarily when they 
heard a noise in the corridor, The victim redressed and 
attempted to go to bed, but this upset appellant Elliott 
who grabbed the victim and wrestled him to the floor, 
taking the victim's mattress with him (T.35). Elliott 
once again took the victim's pants and shorts off and 
wrestled him back to the bars (T.37). This time the 
victim was held by Elliott facing Clayton who kept placing 
his penis in the victim's face, at this point he made contact 
with the victim's mouth (T.38,89). 
A third incident followed, wherein Elliott again 
forced the victim to the bars. When the victim began to 
scream for help Clayton forced an old sock in his mouth 
to quiet him (T.41,52,78). During this incideRt the 
co:-i tents of a shat11?00 bottle were forced up the victim's 
rectum by Clayton (T.43,48). Clayton and Elliott then 
both attempted to insert their penises into the victim's 
mouth (T.46,90). In light of his resistence, appellant 
Clayton then placed a choke hold on the victim who again 
became unconscious a:-id did not reawake until the next 
morning (T.45). The victim's testimony was corroborated 
by Brad Parry, an inmate in another cell at the time, who 
~atched the incident through the meal slot in his door 
(T.111,118). 
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The victim attempted to notify officials about 
what happened by writing "Help" on his medical form but 
that was not immediately noted (T,11), 
The appellants in the trial court denied any intent 
to do serious bodily injury to the victim (T,160,177), or 
any intent to engage in sexual acts with the victim (T,158, 
178,184). Appellant Elliott objected to the failure to give 
instruction on assault by a prisoner (T,237), but not to 
any of the other instructions considered below, The 
instructions given by the trial court allowed the jury to 
find the appellants gui~ty of aggravated sexual assault 
or forcible sodomy or not guilty of any crime, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT GAVE AN INSTRUCTION 
ON THE ONLY APPROPRIATE LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF FORCIBLE SODOMY, 
The appellant's contention that error occurred as 
a result of the trial court's failure to give an instruction 
on the lesser included offinse of forcible sodomy in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403 (1953, as amended) is without 
merit. The appellants were convicted of this crime after 
the judge issued instruction No. 10 which provides: 
You may find either of the defendants 
guilty of any offense which is necessarily 
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(R, 49). 
included in the charge of aggravated sexual 
assault as charged in the Information if in 
your judgment, the evidence supports ~uch a 
verdict under these instructions, 
To enable you to apply the foregoing 
instructions, you are instructed that the 
offense of aggravated sexual assault, as 
charged in the Information, necessarily 
includes the crime of "forcible sodomy," 
which is a lesser offense, the elements of 
which are stated in paragraphs Numbered "l" 
and "2" of Instruction No, 7. 
If you find, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
that the defendants are guilty of an offense 
included within the charge in the Information, 
but entertain a reasonable doubt as to the 
crime of which they are guilty, it is your 
duty to convict them only of the lesser offense, 
The elements of forcible sodomy as listed in instruction 
No. 7 provide: 
1. That on or about the 4th day of May, 
1980, at Utah County, Utah, the defendants, 
\iilliam Clayton and Larry Elliott, did engaqe 
~n a sexual act involving the genitals of 
defendants and the mouth of Dennis Frazier, 
2, That such sexual act was corrunitted 
without consent of Dennis Frazier. 
~hese elements are consistent with § 76-5-403 Utah Code Ann. 
(1953, as amended) which provides: 
(1) A person corrunits sodomy when he engages 
in any sexual act involving the genitals of one 
oerson and the mouth or anus of another person, 
~eoardless of the sex of either participant. 
(2) A person corrunits forcible sodomy when 
he corrunits sodomy upon another without the other's 
consent. 
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Thus the appellants contention of error is without merit, 
since the trial court adequately instructed the jury on 
the lesser included offense of forcible sodomy § 76-5-403 
Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended), 
POINT II 
INSTRUCTIONS, RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME 
ON APPEAL, ARE NOT REVIEWABLE UNLESS A 
FAILURE TO GIVE THEM SUA SPONTE, RESULTED 
IN A MANIFEST INJUSTICE; NO SUCH INJUSTICE 
HAS BEEN SHOWN, 
Respondent does not dispute the basic premise that 
a defendant in a criminal case should be allowed to present 
his theory of the case to the jury. However, in State v. 
Hendricks, 596 P,2d 633 (Utah 1979) this Court recognized 
that "the right is not absolute, and a defense theory must 
be supported by a certain quantum of evidence before an 
instruction as to an included offense need be given." See 
also, State v. Close, 28 Utah 2d 144, 499 P.2d 287 (1972); 
State v. McCarthy, 25 Utah 2d 425, 483 P.2d 890 (1971); 
State v. Johnson, 112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947). Because 
the right is not unlimited, the trial court is not necessari~ 
bound to give all instructions relating to defense theories 
simply because they are requested or characterized by the 
defendant as reflecting his theory of the case. This is 
especially true where the defendant does not request an 
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instruction, In such a case, the decision to give an 
instruction is totally within the discretion of the trial 
court, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure § 77-35-19(c) 
provides: 
No party may assign as error any portion 
of the charge or omission therefrom unless 
he objects thereto before the jury is 
instructed, stating distinctly the matter 
to which he objects and the ground of his 
objection, Notwithstanding a party's 
failure to object, error may be assigned 
to instructions in order to avoid manifest 
injustice. 
As here demonstrated, the general rule is that error will 
not be assigned to instructions given to the jury unless 
objections to those instructions or omissions are made in 
the trial court. Even though a party may raise error on 
appeal based on something not objected to below this should 
::ml~· be a110-.. 1ed v.-:-iere manifest injustice would result if 
~he claim of error ~as not allowed. 
The statute is based upon sound policy considerations. 
~ttorneys QUS~ be re~uired to call a court's attention to 
poten~ial errors w~ich could be avoided or corrected at the 
~ime. Otherwise an attorney could invite error or inten-
~ionally fail to call a courts attention to correctable 
reversible error, thus ensuring two chances to win his case if 
'.1e or she loses at t'.!e trial. With the invited error, he or she 
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can appeal and obtain a second trial, where one trial 
would have sufficed. Thus the system could be bogged 
down in costly, unnecessary appeals and new trials. 
See Simpson v. General Motors Corp., infra at 9, 
In the present case the trial court correctly 
issued instructions to the jury which gave them three 
alternatives. The jury could find the defendants guilty 
of aggravated sexual assault in violation of Utah Code 
Ann,§ 76-5-405(l)(a)(ii) (1953, as amended), or guilty 
of forcible sodomy in violation of Utah Code Ann, § 76-
5-403 (1953, as amended) or they could have found them 
not guilty of any crime if the evidence was insufficient 
to support guilty verdicts beyond a reasonable doubt, 
The evidence was either sufficient to establish their 
guilt on the crimes instructed or insufficisnt to find 
them guilty at all. The instructions which the appellants 
now, for the first time on appeal, claimed are applicable, 
are discussed in Points III and IV, infra. 
There has been no showing of manifest injustice 
to the appellants by the trial court's not giving the 
instructions which they now claim are applicable, Absent 
such a demonstration, this Court should not review the 
instructions raised by the appellants for the first time 
on appeal. 
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The appellants, after failing in the requests 
they did make below, now attempt, for the first time on 
appeal, to raise other allegedly applicable instructions, 
In Simpson v. General ~otors Corporation, 24 Utah 2d 301, 
470 P.2d 399 (1970) this Court said: 
Orderly procedure, whose proper 
purpose is the final settlement of 
controversies, requires that a party 
must present his entire case and his 
theory or theories of recovery to the 
trial court; and having done so, he 
cannot thereafter change to some 
different theory and thus attempt to 
keep in motion a merry-go-round of 
litigation. 
470 P.2d at 401. See also: State v. Treadway, 28 Utah 2d 
160, 499 P,2d 846 (1972); State v. Starlight Club, 17 Utah 
2d 174, 406 P.2d 912 (1965). 
~he trial court was given no opportunity to rule 
on the appiicabil~ty of the requested instructions. There 
1 .. 'as no request fo::- many of the instructions now raised on 
appeal and in the absence of a showing of manifest injustice 
~o the ap?ellants, t~e instructio~s should not be reviewed 
by this Cour~. 
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POINT III 
INSTRUCTIONS, RAISED NOW FOR THE FIRST 
TIME, ON APPEAL, AND THE REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION OF ASSAULT BY A PRISONER 
ARE NOT LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES OF 
AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT, 
In addition to an instruction on forcible sodomy 
discussed in Point I, supra, the appellants contend that 
the trial court erred in not giving instruction on: 
1) assault by a prisoner in violation of § 76-5-102,5 
Utah Code Ann, (1953, as amended); 2) aggravated assault 
by a prisoner in violation of § 76-5-103.5 Utah Code Ann, 
(1953, as amended); 3) attempted forcible sodomy in 
violation of§ 76-4-101 Utah Code Ann, (1953, as amended); 
and 4) forcible sexual abuse in violation of § 76-5-404(1) 
Utah Code Ann. (1953, as amended). Further they state 
that this error should be the basis of reversal regardless 
of the fact that there was only an objection to the failure 
to give the assault by a prisoner instruction by only one 
of the appellants--appellant Elliott. As noted above, all 
the other instructions are not properly before this Court. 
However, if this Court should decide to review 
the appellants' requested instructions it will find that 
these instructions are not lesser included offenses and 
thus need not have been given. 
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The standard through which an offense is deter-
mined to be lesser and included in another offense is well 
established. 
Under l'tah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(3) (a) (1953, as 
amended), a defendant may be convicted of an offense included 
in the offense charged when: 
(a) It is established by proof 
of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission 
of the offense charged , , , 
This statute codifies the so-called "same evidence" test 
for an included offense as defined in previous case law, 
See State v. Brennan, 13 Utah 2d 198, 371 P,2d 27 (1962); 
State v. Sunter, 550 P.2d 184 (Utah 1976); and State v, Woolman, 
84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d 645 (1934), 
In State v. Brennan, supra, the Court elaborated 
on the def~nitio~ of a lesser included offense and stated: 
The rule as to when one offense is 
included in another is that the 
areater of:ense includes a lesser 
one w~en establishment of the greater 
wou:d ~ecessarily include proof of 
all t~e elements necessary to prove 
the lesser. Conversely, it is only 
when ~te proof of the lesser offense 
requires some element not involved 
in the areater offense that the lesser 
wou:d ~;~ be an included offense, 
13 l'tah 2d at 197, 371 P.2d at 29 (emphasis added). 
Thus, in accorda~ce with both the statutory and judicial 
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definitions of a lesser included offense, it is necessary 
to look to the legal elements of the crimes to see if 
the "alleged" lesser included offenses only contain elements 
which are not part of the qreater offense. 
The instructions profferred by the appellants, 
for the first time on appeal, are not within this standard 
and thus are not lesser included offenses of aggravated 
sexual assault. 
Appellant Elliott, in the court below, objected 
to the court's denial of his request for a "lesser included 
offense" instruction on assault by a prisoner (T,237), 
Appellant's requested instruction provided: 
(R. 45), 
If you do not find the defendants guilty 
of aggrevated [sic] sexual assault, you may 
find the defendants guilty of the lesser 
included offense of assault by a prisoner. 
76-5-102.5 Assault by prisoner.-Any 
prisoner who commits assault, intending to 
cause bodily injury, is guilty of a felony 
of the third degree. 
76-5-102. Assault-(1) Assault is: 
(a) PJ1 attempt, with unlawful force 
or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
or 
(b) A threat, accompanied by a show of 
immediate force or violence, to do bodily 
injury to another, 
76-5-101. "Prisoner" defined.-For 
purpose of this part "prisoner" means any 
person who is in custody of a peace officer 
pursuant to a lawful arrest or who is confined 
in a jail or other penial [sic] institution 
regardless of whether the confinement is legal. 
-12-
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The trial court's refusal to give the appellants' 
proffered instruction was totally correct, 
Under § 76-5-405 Utah Code Ann, (1953, as amended) 
aggravated sexual assault is defined as: 
(1) A person commits aggravated sexual 
assault if: 
(a) In the course of a rape or attempted 
rape or forcible sodomy or attempted 
forcible sodomy: 
(i) The actor causes serious bodily injury 
to the victim; or 
(ii) The actor compels submission to the 
rape or forcible sodomy by threat of 
kidnapping, death, or serious bodily injury 
to be inflicted imminently on any person, 
The crime of assault by a prisoner is defined in § 76-5-
102.5 as follows: 
Any prisoner who commits assault, intending 
to cause bodily injury, is guilty of a 
felony of the third degree, 
The elements of the alleged lesser offense include an 
element which is not necessary to the proof of the alleged 
greater offense of aggravated sexual assault. In order to 
establish assault by a prisoner there must be proof that 
the defendant was in fact a prisoner when the act occurred, 
On the other hand, the crime of aggravated sexual assault 
does not require proof of this element. An individual may 
be convicted of aggravated sexual assault regardless of 
whether or not he is a prisoner, thus "proof of the lesser 
-13-
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offense requires some element not involved in the greater 
offense" State v. Brennan, supra, which means that the 
alleged lesser offense is not a lesser included offense 
of aggravated sexual assault, 
Similar to assault by a prisoner, irrunediately 
preceeding, the aggravated assault by a prisoner statute 
contains an element which is not present in the aggravated 
sexual assault statute. Namely that the actor was a prisoner 
when the assault occurred, Since this is not an element 
of the "greater offense," the aggravated sexual assault 
statute does not come within the lesser included offense 
standard of State v, Brennan,,~, and it is clear that 
aggravated assault by a prisoner is not a lesser included 
offense of aggravated sexual assault. 
Also, aggravated assault by a prisoner cannot 
be a "lesser" included offense because it carries the 
same penalty as the crime with which the appellants were 
charged. Both crimes are second degree felonies. 
Forcible sexual abuse also contains elements 
necessary to conviction which are not present in the aggra-
vated sexual assault offense, thus forcible sexual abuse 
is not a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual assault. 
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The forcible sexual abuse statute § 76-5-404 provides: 
~(l) A person commits forcible sexual 
abuse if, under circumstances not amounting 
to rape or sodomy, or attempted rape or 
sodomy, he touches the anus or any part of 
the genitals of another, or otherwise takes 
indecent liberties with another, or causes 
another to take indecent liberties with 
himself or another, with intent to cause 
substantial emotional or bodily pain to any 
person or with the intent to arouse or 
gratify the sexual desire of any person, 
without the consent of the other, 
(2) Forcible sexual abuse is a felony 
of the third degree, 
The forcible sexual assault statute is aimed at 
punishing the taking of indecent liberties with the intent 
to cause emotional or bodily pain or the intent to arouse 
or gratify the sexual desire of any person, This intent 
element is not the same as the intent element ~ound in the 
aggravated sexua::. assault s~atute and thus forcible sexual 
abuse "requires sor:Le elemer.t not involved in the greater 
offense" of aggravated sexual assault, Therefore, in 
accordance with State v, Brennan, ~, forcible sexual 
abuse is not a lesse~ i~c!~ded cffense of aggravated sexual 
3...SSS.Ul t. 
"Attempts" to commit a crime are statutorily 
declared includeC. offenses in § 76-1-402 (3) (b) Utah Code 
- d) ~hus at~empted forcible sodomy, Ann. (1953, as ar..e:-ice . 
is an included offer.se of forcible sodomy which is a lesser 
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included offense of aggravated sexual assault, the original 
charge against the appellants, However, the circumstances 
of this case made the giving an instruction on attempted 
forcible sodomy inappropriate, (See Point IV below). 
POINT IV 
ASSUMING, THAT INSTRUCTIONS NOW RAISED FOR 
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, COULD BE CONSIDERED 
INCLUDED OFFENSES, THEY WERE INCONSISTENT WITH 
APPELLANTS' EVIDENCE AND THEORY OF THE CASE, 
AND NOT JUSTIFIED IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Even if, arguendo, all of the instructions raised 
by the appellants' on appeal, are somehow considered lesser 
included offenses, the requested instructions would still be 
inappropriate, Included offense instructions need not be given 
unless there is evidence to acquit the defendant of the higher 
crime and convict him of the lesser, putative crime. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-33-6 reads: 
The jury may find the defendant 
guilty of any offense the commission of 
which is necessarily included in that 
with which he is charged in the indict-
ment or information, or of an attempt 
to commit the offense, 
In State v, Bender, 581 P,2d 1019, 1020 (Utah 19781 
this Court stated that the above section is governed by Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-1-402 (4) (1953, as amended), under which: 
The court shall not be obligated to 
charge the jury with respect to an 
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included offense unless there is 
a rational basis for a verdict 
acquitting the defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting 
him of the included offense, 
(Emphasis added,) 
?he Court also noted that this statute is a codification of 
case law which extends back to 1889, People v. Robinson, 
6 Utah 101, 21 P. 403 (1889), 
In State v. Dougherty, 550 P.2d 175 (Utah 1976), 
the defendant was convicted of the crime of unlawful 
distribution for value of a controlled substance. He appealed, 
alleging that the trial court erred in refusing to give an 
instruction on the lesser included offense of possession 
of a controlled substance. In affirming the conviction, 
this Honorable Court held that where defense testimony 
could prove only complete innocence, the defendant was not 
en~~tled to an ins~ruction on the lesser included offense. 
?his Court citing Lisby v. State, 83 Nev. 183, 414 P.2d 
592 (1966), enunciated the three situations in which the 
~uestion o~ whe~he~ ~o instruct on lesser included offenses 
are frequently encountered: 
.. ?irst, where there is evidence 
1·.'hich 1·:ould absolve the defendant from 
guilt of a greater offense, or degree, 
but would support a finding of guilt of 
a-lesser offense, or degree; the instruc-
tion is mandatory. 
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Second, where the evidence would not 
support a finding of guilt in the commission 
of the lesser offense or degree, For 
example, the defendant denies any complicity 
in the crime charged, and thus lays no 
foundation for any intermediate verdict, or 
where the elements of the offense differ,~ 
and some element essential to the lesser 
offense is either not proved or shown not 
to exist. This second situation renders an 
instruction on a lesser included offense 
erroneous, because it is not pertinent. 
Third, is an intermediate situation, 
One where the elements of the greater 
offense include all the elements of the 
lesser offense; because, by its very nature, 
the greater offense could not have been 
committed without defendant having the 
intent in doing the acts, which constitute 
the lesser offense, In such a situation 
instructions on the lesser included offense 
may be given because all elements of the 
lesser offense have been proved, 
However, such an instruction may properly 
be refused if the prosecution has met its 
burden of proof of the greater offense, 
and there is no evidence tending to reduce 
the greater offense. 550 P,2d at 176, 177. 
(Emphasis added.) 
This was affirmed in State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 
1977); State v. Bell, 563 P,2d 186 (Utah 1977). Thus an 
instruction is not properly given if there is no evidence 
to support a conviction on the lesser offense and acquit 
the appellant of the greater offense. 
Furthermore, if a defendant's theory of the case is 
all theory and no evidence, or based on the evidence, so 
unreasonable that it does not satisfy the requirements of a 
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defense, no instruction thereon is required, See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-201, et seq, (1953, as amended), 
The appellant correctly states that in order to 
have instructions on lesser included offenses given there 
nust be a basis for acquitting the defendant of the greater 
crime and convictina him of the lesser, 
In the present case, the evidence presented by 
the appellants falls under the second situation cited in 
State v. Dougherty, supra, at 18, in which an instruction 
on a lesser included offense is not appropriate at all. 
The appellants denied any complicity in the crime, stating 
that they had no intent to cause the victim any bodily 
injury (T,160,177) or to engage in any sexual acts (T.158, 
178,184). If this ~ere in fact the case, and the jury was 
~nclined to believe appellants' versions of the story, then 
no conviction could stand either for the greater offense 
of aggravated sexual assault or for the "alleged" lesser 
of~ense of assault ty a prisoner, since there would be no 
:ricinal intent. a~ the other hand, if the jury believed, 
as they apparently did, that the appellants forcibly 
sodomized the victim, then there would only be grounds for 
con\·iction of forcible sodomy without a basis to convict on 
~he lesser offense of assault by a prisoner. 
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This case falls directly under the guidelines of 
State v. Douqherty, supra, where the Court declared, "The 
defense testimony could only prove complete innocence," 
There, as here, the appellant tried to proceed on a lesser 
included offense theory, but this was rejected by the 
Court: 
. Such a theory is not available 
to him where the record shows he could 
only be found guilty or not guilty of the 
crime charged. 550 P,2d at 177, 
It can be said, therefore, that under Utah Code Ann, 
§ 76-1-402 (4) (1953, as amended), the trial court in the case 
at bar was not obliged to instruct as to an included offense, 
because even though the jury may have chosen to believe the 
appellant, thereby acquitting him, no evidentiary basis 
existed upon which a conviction of assault by a prisoner couN 
stand. Since Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) is stated in the 
cor.junctive, both statutory requisites must be present before 
the trial court would be required to instruct on the includ~ 
of:'ense. 
Thus the trial court did not err in refusing to 
instruct on assault by a prisoner, even if assault by a 
prisoner could somehow be considered a lesser included 
of:'ense of aggravated sexual assault. 
Similarly, the evidence below did not justify an 
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instruction on aggravated assault by a prisoner, As 
no~ed above, the appellants' theory of the case in the 
trial court was that they were teasing the victim and 
did not possess any intent to cause serious bodily injury 
':o the 'Tictirn nor any intent to sodomize the victim, 
hccording to the appellants, they were merely teasing 
the victim in an attempt to get him to tell them about the 
"rape" he was charged with (T,158,176), If this theory 
were believed by the jury, the appellants could not have 
been convicted of any crime for which they now request 
instructions, not aggravated sexual assault, nor forcible 
sodomy, nor aggravated assault by a prisoner, 
Thus, "the defense testimony could only prove 
co;::iplete innocence," State v, Dougherty, ~· There, 
as tere, an ins~ruction on the "alleged" lesser offense 
instruc':ion need not be given by the trial court, 
~he evidence and the appellants' theory of the 
case di~ not justi=y an instruction on attempted forcible 
The at':em?t statute § 76-4-101 Utah Code Ann, 
'1953, as amended) provides: 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is 
ouilt? o= an attempt to commit a crime if 
acting with the kind of culpability otherwise 
required for the commission of the offense, 
he engages in conduct constituting a sub-
stantial s":ep tov:ard commission of the offense. 
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(2) For purposes of this part, conduct 
does not constitute a substantial step 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the 
actor's intent to corrunit the offense, 
(Emphasis added,) 
The appellants' theory in the court below was that 
they possessed no intent to either, cause serious bodily 
injury or engage in sodomy with the victim. If the jury 
chose to believe this theory there would not be a basis for 
a conviction of any crime. Not forcible sodomy or aggravated 
sexual assault nor attempted forcible sodomy. Therefore, 
as in State v. Dougherty, supra, an instruction may properly 
be refused if there is no evidence to both convict on the 
lesser offense and acquit of the greater offense. As in 
Dougherty if the jury believed the appellants theory of the 
case it would only prove complete innocence, thus the appellar1: 
were not entitled to such an instruction. 
Assuming, arguendo, that forcible sexual abuse 
were a lesser included offense of aggravated sexual assault, 
neithe~ the facts of this case nor the theory presented by 
the appellants justify such an instruction. The appellants 
denied intent to engage in any sexual acts with the victim 
(T.158,178,184), thus there is no basis upon which the 
jury could find intent to arouse the sexual desire of any 
person. The appellants also denied any intent to cause 
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pain to the victim {T,160,177) thus, no intent to cause 
substantial emotional or bodily pain could possibly be 
found by a jury if they believed the appellants, Although 
the appellants acknowledged some unlawful touching of the 
victim they denied any contact with his genitals or anus, 
Once again the appellants' theory and testimony could only 
prove complete innocence, thus the appellants are not 
entitled to an instruction on an "alleged" lesser included 
offense, Therefore, the trial court did not err in not, 
sua sponte, giving an instruction on forcible sexual abuse, 
CONCLUSION 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure § 77-35-19(c) 
?ro~ide that a ?arty may not assign error on appeal to 
-:he c::-:arcing or cm~ssion of instructions by the trial court 
~here no objecticn was made in the trial court. The 
excep~io~ ~o this rule is where failure to do so will 
res~l~ i~ nanifest injustice to the parties. In this case 
-:he a?pe:lants d'~ not demonstrate that manifest injustice 
-.,o-~ld occur to tten, therefore no error should be assigned 
~rorn ~nstructions no~ raised by appellants for the first 
-:ime on c.p;ieal. 
~urthermore, even if this Court should examine 
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the instructions raised by the appellants there is no 
basis upon which reversible error may be found, The trial 
court instructed on the lesser offense of forcible sodomy, 
and appellants were convicted thereof. The other 
instructions raised now by appellants are not lesser 
included offenses of aggravated sexual assault. Finally, 
assuming, arguendo, that the unrequested instructions 
could somehow be considered lesser included offenses, the 
trial court was not obligated to qive the instructions 
because there was no rational basis upon which the 
appellants could be "acquitted of the greater offense and 
convicted of the lesser offense" State v. Brennan, supra. 
Therefore the instructions as given by the trial court 
were proper and the appellants' convictions of forcible 
sodomy should stand. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DJl_VID L, l'JILKINSON 
Attorney General 
ROBERT R. \•JALLACE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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